

**Joint Task Force Commanders and the “ Three Block War “
Setting the Conditions for Tactical Success**

MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

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This monograph analyzes the complex strategic situation and defines each "Block" within the "Three Block War," and the required tactical tasks. It reviews current joint doctrine to determine the requirements of a JTF Commander and how they influence tactical actions. It analyzes the Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia during the early 1990's and synthesizes this analysis to provide conclusions and recommendations on how to set operational level of war conditions to ensure success at the tactical level of war.

Conclusions from this research underscore the importance of the JTF Commander in setting conditions at the operational level of war. This monograph recommends conditions that must be established in order for JTF Commanders to effectively support tactical commanders and units in a "Three Block War."

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
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Chapter I –Introduction

It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal. To this end it is necessary to decide the development of operations before the initial blow is delivered.¹

Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery

At 0415 on 9 December 1992, U.S. Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) stormed ashore over the beaches of Mogadishu, Somalia to secure its port and airfield. The classic amphibious assault was the lead echelon of a force consisting of over 38,000 soldiers and Marines from over 20 nations. Their purpose was not to conquer and implement U.S. policy through force of arms, but to secure humanitarian relief sites in order to feed a population on the brink of death from famine and starvation. On 11 December in Mogadishu, Cobra helicopter gunships fired on and destroyed two vehicles, called “technicals,” armed with heavy caliber machine guns. The United States, in cooperation with the United Nations (UN), was not conducting one operation but three operations simultaneously. These three distinct operations included amphibious assaults, humanitarian assistance and raging gun battles in a major capital city with a population of over 100,000 people.

The “Three Block War”

After operations in Somalia, General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, spoke of future conflict and stated it would not imitate the sweeping armored maneuver of Desert Storm, but resemble the chaos of Somalia or Chechnya.² Entitling it the “Three Block War,” General Krulak explained that this type of conflict contains three major operations being conducted by U.S. servicemen in the most complex operating environment for military forces, urban terrain. These three major operations, which could

occur sequentially or more than likely, simultaneously, consist of humanitarian assistance (HA), peace operations and combat operations.

Since the 1986 Goldwater/ Nichol's Defense Reorganization Act, the U.S. military has acknowledged the importance of operations planned and executed in a joint or combined environment. Joint Task Forces (JTFs) or Combined JTFs (CJTFs) will be organized and deployed rapidly in order to provide the National Command Authority (NCA) with an appropriate response to the "Three Block War." Commanders of these JTFs will require carefully orchestrated operations in order to meet the desired strategic endstate established by the NCA.

Since the time of the ancient Greeks and before the Industrial Revolution, warfare was concerned with tactics, the fighting of battles and engagements, and strategy, how those battles and engagements influenced the policy of nations. Before the Industrial Revolution, nations conducted a single battle that frequently decided the course of war between those nations. The Industrial Revolution facilitated the development of tremendous military capabilities that were complex and impossible to defeat in a single battle. Warfare evolved to require numerous battles and engagements, linked together to achieve strategic objectives. This level of war is defined in Joint Publication 3-0, *Operations*, as the operational level of war, which states, "the operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives."³ The operational commander is responsible to ensure this linkage is attained by designing, organizing and integrating major operations. Major operations are military actions that achieve a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.⁴ A campaign plan is the operational

commanders tool to link tactical actions in time, space, and purpose in order to achieve strategic objectives.⁵

Although units are not rigidly associated with a particular level of war, Joint Task Forces (JTFs) normally operate at the operational level of war. JTFs exploit a variety of tactical actions in order to achieve strategic objectives. They must decide when, where, for what purposes, and under what conditions to give battle or refuse battle.⁶ In the "Three Block War," a Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) must look beyond the battle and seek to shape events in advance in order to create the most favorable conditions possible for future actions.⁷

Statement of the Problem

The end of the 20th Century confronts the U.S. with a changing global security situation. Regional security challenges require the National Command Authority to employ all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, economic, military) to stabilize conflicts before they engulf whole regions in war. Military forces continue to be called upon to intervene rapidly in order to establish conditions in which other forms of national power can be engaged. The focus of this monograph is to determine how a Joint Task Force Commander sets conditions in a "Three Block War" that enable tactical commanders to accomplish their mission.

The methodology to answer this question correctly requires four parts. First, this monograph defines what is meant by the statement "Three Block War." This discussion covers how this complex scenario developed with the fall of the Soviet Union and increased global urbanization. It further defines each "Block" and the tactical tasks associated with it. Second, the monograph explains the major functions and tasks the CJTF

performs and the influence they have on the environment in which tactical commanders must operate. Third, this monograph analyzes operations in Somalia to determine what conditions the CJTF set or fail to set and what tasks did he perform or fail to perform. Finally, this monograph recommends the optimal conditions for a "Three Block War" and what functions and tasks the CJTF must perform to achieve these optimal conditions.

The United States finds itself in a unique position politically and militarily to intervene in regional conflicts and attempt to restore peace. JTFs have been deployed throughout the 1990's in several of these interventions to conduct operations in order to create a stable environment. Future CJTFs, operating at the operational level, must be prepared to set the right conditions for tactical commanders to ensure tactical actions lead to the desired political endstate. To make appropriate decisions CJTFs must understand exactly what type of operations the JTF will be conducting and the tactical tasks associated with those operations.

Chapter II -Defining the “Three Block War”

Causes of Chaos in the Developing World

In June 1995 General Charles Krulak, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, attempted to reorient the strategic outlook of the U.S. Marine Corps when he developed the phrase “Three Block War.” This simple phrase has caused the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct vast studies and resource numerous experiments to try and solve the problems of the “Three Block War.” Such experiments consist of the U.S. Marine Corps URBAN WARRIOR exercises and the U.S. Army’s Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) at Fort Benning, Georgia. Yet, before many of these technological solutions can be applied at the tactical level the problem of how to fight the “Three Block War” must be defined at the operational level of war.

The “Three Block War” is a relatively new phenomenon. In order to understand why, one has to first examine why the strategic situation deteriorated in order for this type of complex scenario to arise in developing countries. In the early 1990's massive political change occurred in the strategic security environment when the Soviet Union disintegrated and left the United States and its allies (principally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) as the primary power in the world. A bipolar world gave way to one in which regional conflicts began to emerge with greater frequency. Conflict in developing nations also began to emerge as a result of mass migration toward urban areas.

Fall of the Soviet Union

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union disintegrated. The end of the Cold War ended many conflicts, but others that were local in nature and checked by superpower interest began to spiral out of control.⁸ Other regional tensions that

had remained dormant for over fifty years began to evolve into armed revolt and conflict. During the Cold War, the bi-polar political situation required many less developed nations to align themselves with a superpower; nations of immense political, military and economic power and influence. The interest in these less developed nations most often centered on gaining a strategic advantage, such as access to a natural resource or geographic location. Developing nations offered these advantages in return for security and internal stability provided by the superpower. In many instances superpowers courted less powerful or developed nations by offering economic and military aid in exchange for conditions that would further their interests. Even more developed nations such as India and Cuba still aligned themselves with a superpower in an attempt to gain a regional edge by receiving weapons in exchange for basing access or intelligence on the opposing side.

When the strategic situation changed, economic and military benefits were significantly reduced and left many nations without a steady flow of capital from their superpower benefactor. This sent the economies of many nations tumbling and created discontent amongst their populations. This discontent created civil strife within several of these nations, whose governments attempted to maintain order through force. Violence begets violence and internal stability within the nation declined. As most national seats of government are located in urban environments, conflicts between government forces and opposition forces frequently disrupted or destroyed national infrastructure, precipitating humanitarian crises.

The United Nations (UN) recognizes that civil strife occurring within a sovereign nation is primarily a concern of that sovereign nation. When the conflict begins to effect neighboring nations due to refugee flow or cross border incursions of armed nationals,

those nations affected by or concerned with spreading conflict must act in order to preserve internal and regional stability. These actions range from providing humanitarian assistance to refugees by distributing food, medicine and potable water to providing peacekeeping force assistance to a nation by helping to monitor the terms of a cease fire agreement. Increases in human suffering and dying which have accompanied the proliferation of failed nation-states have prompted the UN to play an active part in preventing local conflicts from becoming regional conflicts and destabilizing large portions of the world further increasing U.S. participation in peace operations.

Global Urbanization

The second reason the “Three Block War” has developed as a strategic scenario is due to increased global urbanization. There are two main reasons that urbanized areas have grown so rapidly. First, the overall increases in world population and in particular the rapid population growth in developing countries. Secondly, the rise of capitalism has linked national economies and created a global marketplace. Some now refer to this as “Globalization.”

According to the February 1996 study entitled “World Population Trends, Regional Issues and the Middle East as a Case Study” conducted by the Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), overall world population will grow to over 9.7 billion by the year 2100. It also states that populations will grow far more rapidly in poorer areas. Africa, in particular, will experience the greatest problems as a result of population growth. Key cases are Algeria, which will grow from 25 million in 1990 to 39 million in 2010, and Egypt, which will grow from 54 million in 1990 to 73 million in 2010.⁹ This growth

creates shortages in adequate housing, food, water, preventative medical treatment and jobs.¹⁰

This population growth will create a “massive urban transition,” in the words of the joint United Nations, World Bank, and World Resources Institute publication *World Resources 1996-1997*, “unlike that of any other time in history.”¹¹ The study states 90 percent of all growth in urbanization will occur in developing nations and add to the problems listed above a shortage of landfill sites for waste disposal, increased air pollution, and social alienation between a small wealthy population and a large population living in poverty. Developing countries will see their population’s outgrow their capacity to provide for food, water, power generation, and housing needs. Neither will nations be able to provide adequate numbers of jobs or educational opportunities. This perception of helplessness could create civil strife amongst an ever-increasing population located in urban areas.¹²

The second reason for increased urbanization will be the increasing linkage between national economies in the global market. According to the 1997 study entitled “*Global Trends 2005, The Challenge of a New Millennium*” produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, growth in developing nations has been four to seven percent compared to only two percent in developed countries. With large free trade areas such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), multinational corporations (MNCs) have begun to court developing countries with inexpensive labor and the necessary natural resources to fuel economic growth within the developed countries. In the early 1990’s there were over 37,000 MNCs controlling 206,000 foreign affiliate corporations. This mass of MNCs has created numerous jobs

through foreign direct investment by building factories or providing the infrastructure to remove natural resources. These new jobs have been mostly located in urban areas to better exploit transportation networks to international markets.¹³

Unfortunately, developing nations do not possess sophisticated government bureaucracies or the necessary institutions to handle these increasing urban populations. Governments have to collect taxes, develop plans to handle future growth, and execute these plans in order to develop infrastructure, education and social organizations that will create a growing economy and society. Yet many governments are not efficiently collecting the necessary revenue from multinational corporations and redistributing it to sustain growth in other areas. Although wages for the average worker have increased, the nation and more specifically the cities are not benefiting from MNCs. This situation creates a population that demands greater services from its local and national government, which may or may not be capable of meeting these demands.¹⁴

Overall, globalization of world economies has caused a shift in the United States National Security Strategy in order to protect emerging markets and sustain economic growth. If these emerging markets are not stable due to internal strife within urban areas, MNCs will either withdraw their investment or not invest at all. If MNCs either withdraw their investment or do not invest at all this will perpetuate the poverty cycle within many developing countries, thus causing greater strife within the urban areas and instability within developing nations.

Certain conditions are being established due to a change in the global security strategy, increased urbanization and globalization of the emerging market based economies. First are regional conflicts that rapidly become global concerns. When human

suffering reaches epidemic proportions and is constantly reflected in today's mass media, nations are forced to act to prevent the conflict from spreading. This concept is reflected in the definition of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which is "focused on deterring war and promoting peace."¹⁵ Another condition created is mass suffering due to the high concentration of people within the urban areas. A natural disaster or local conflict characterized by mid to low level combat operations can quickly debilitate services provided to the urban population. This can cause suffering on an unprecedented scale so rapidly that nations may only be able to stem a portion of the suffering.

This imposes certain implications upon a Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) when executing a "Three Block War." As will be discussed later, a CJTF acting as an operational commander must link tactical operations in order to meet the strategic endstate. In the "Three Block War" the CJTF must ensure tactical commanders are successful by establishing certain key enabling conditions. Yet as we have seen the operating environment will be extremely complex and contain a high number of non-combatants. The CJTF must understand what is in each "Block" and what conditions he must establish to ensure success for the tactical commanders executing that particular operation within the "Three Block War." To determine how the CJTF must set these conditions for tactical commanders it is necessary to define exactly what tactical tasks or engagements are performed in each "Block."

Block One – Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

Humanitarian Assistance is defined as programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. HA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of host nation

civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing HA (JP 1-02).¹⁶

Military forces have conducted HA missions since the time of the Romans, when a Roman fleet tried to save the population of Pompeii after Mount Vesuvius erupted. Tactical commanders face a myriad of tasks under the most austere conditions when conducting HA missions. Yet before operational considerations can be defined for HA missions, the tactical tasks that will be executed must be defined. But why military forces? Military forces are normally selected because they can rapidly deploy to the crisis area, are self-sustaining and therefore do not place a burden on the already encumbered site, and can provide emergency services such as reactive (trauma) and preventative medical services, bulk water production, and food distribution. Military forces also provide security for their own force and assets and to those seeking assistance through well-disciplined units that possess a clear chain of command.

Tasks Tactical Commanders Must Accomplish in HA Missions.

The first means in which a tactical commander receives his tasks comes in the form of a mission statement from the CJTF. Joint Publication 3-07.6 (Draft) lists four types of HA missions. They are relief missions, dislocated civilian support missions, security missions and technical assistance missions. From these categories tactical commanders can determine the many specified and implied tasks that will be required.¹⁷ The who, what, when, where and why contained in a mission statement give him a basis to begin planning. "Who" defines the unit that must perform the mission. If the proper forces are not organic to the unit assigned to carry out the mission, the commander must request these additional forces.

“What” defines exactly what type of task (s) the unit must perform. These tasks determine if the unit is trained properly or if it might require additional training or assets that are not organic to the unit. One example is an infantry battalion tasked to distribute food over extended distances. If the infantry unit does not possess organic transportation for hauling bulk supplies, the commander must request additional support in order for the unit to complete its mission successfully. HA missions conducted by U.S. forces normally require a myriad of tasks to be performed at the tactical level. These tasks often differ with each mission. Such tasks include, but are not limited to, providing food, which includes transportation into the country, distribution to the areas in greatest need, security for its distribution and sometimes its actual preparation. Another task performed at the tactical level is providing medical services. These services provide emergency care to wounded and sick and preventative care against infectious diseases to include inoculations and consulting on sanitation conditions. Another task could be providing temporary shelter for displaced civilians or demining technical assistance to ensure displaced civilians can return home. Overall, the commander must ensure his unit is properly resourced to meet the tasks ahead.

“When” places a time on how long the commander has to prepare his unit for the mission before it is deployed. In the initial stages of a HA mission units are deployed immediately without a great amount of time for preparation. In this situation a tactical commander must determine how best to convert his unit’s combat skills into those necessary to complete a HA mission.

“Where” is one of the key elements for the commander when preparing his unit for deployment and employment. If the area of operations is austere or destroyed, he must

determine the requirements to support his own unit in order to not place a burden on the crisis area.

“Why” gives him the focus of his mission and helps him determine the best way to accomplish his mission. As the Prussian military theorist General Carl von Clausewitz describes in his book entitled, *On War*, friction will always be on the battlefield complicating even the simplest functions.¹⁸ As the tactical commander assesses how he will accomplish the mission assigned, understanding the purpose of his tasks will better enable him to adapt to the situation in the area of operations. He must attempt to prepare the unit by evaluating the tasks the unit is normally trained to accomplish and those that will be required in order to accomplish the HA mission.

The CJTF must anticipate many uncertainties at the operational level in order for tactical-level missions to be successful. One uncertainty is the nature and scope of other organizations that operate outside not only the chain of command but also the JTF itself. These come in the forms of non-government organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), UN agencies, and even local organizations such as police or government officials. Another uncertainty in HA missions is the threat to Joint Task Force (JTF) units. The threat can come from infectious diseases, damaged infrastructure that disrupts distribution, or more familiar threats such as roving bandits or well-armed competing factions. Other uncertainties include handling situations in which tactical units are not trained. These include negotiating skills in order to settle disputes, legal issues dealing with civil and criminal law, and security issues with stringent rules of engagement (ROE). These and many other unknowns in the HA “block “ must be addressed by the

CJTF not only from the standpoint of HA missions but also how other "blocks" and JTF actions within those blocks effect and create even more unknowns.

Block Two – Peace Operations

Peace Operations is a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace (JP 1-02).¹⁹

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.²⁰ When tactical commanders are assigned as a PKO force there are certain tasks that he must accomplish in order to successfully complete that mission. Unlike HA missions where the tasks may not align at all with the basic mission of a unit, PKOs are more closely aligned with the combat functions of U.S. military forces. Two major differences exist between PKOs and combat missions. First PKOs are designed to implement a mandate that is already in place, and second they are designed to prevent further conflict.

In PKOs, mandates are legal agreements between parties to end conflict and return to a state of peace. These are arranged by third parties such as the UN or a coalition of nations attempting to prevent the spread of conflict and are agreed upon in the form of a truce, cease-fire, or an accord. Peacekeeping forces are deployed between belligerents in order to break the cycle of violence and give negotiators an opportunity to restore *long-term* peace. Mandates are specific in terms of what each side must accomplish in order for trust to be developed between the former belligerents.²¹ PKO forces must ensure each side is upholding its side of the agreement. Therefore one of the key tactical task is for each unit

responsible for implementation to know and understand the agreement in detail and what to do when one or both sides fails to comply.

U. S. military forces are trained to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the U.S. and its multinational partners.²² This offensive ethos runs contrary to the skills and tasks required of the tactical commander in PKOs. In PKOs, U.S. units are employed in a monitoring function that provides presence, which inhibits hostile actions by disputing parties, and bolsters confidence in the peace process. For tactical commanders to prevent further conflict they must adhere to certain fundamentals. These fundamentals are firmness, impartiality, clarity of intention, anticipation, consent, integration and freedom of movement.²³

Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)

PEO is the application of military force or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to restore peace and order.²⁴ In PEOs, tactical commanders will find themselves in an environment defined by conflict, violence, and disorder, a high level of mistrust and possibly even chaos rather than peace. PEOs are not wars because the focus of these types of operations is “the dispute”, not the belligerent parties. In PEOs, consent of the parties to allow third party intervention is not a requirement. Combat or the threat of its use allows the tactical commander to prepare for events for which his unit is trained. Fundamentals that guide tactical commanders in PEOs are impartiality, restraint in the use of force, a goal

of settlement rather than victory, the use of methods of coercion and the presence of civilians.²⁵

Block Three – Combat Operations

In the “Three Block War,” combat operations within the third block can evolve from two distinctive scenarios. The first is when U.S. military forces are conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as HA missions or PKOs that erupt into a combat engagement and possibly a full scale battle. The second scenario could evolve after a high-intensity battle conducted by U.S. military forces in order to reach war aims or conduct a PEO that now requires humanitarian assistance and peace operations in its aftermath.

U. S. military forces must always conduct security operations in conjunction with HA missions that may or may not involve combat operations against threats that intend to interrupt the stream of aid for political purposes or personal gain. The same occurs in PKOs where the opportunity is available for one party to attack a former belligerent or the peacekeeping force as a result of perceiving weakness or impartiality in the peace process. In PEOs, U.S. military forces may conduct mid to high-intensity combat operations in order to stop the conflict and restore the peace. The result of combat operations could create suffering and endemic pain on the population which, in turn, requires U.S. forces to conduct a HA mission and peace operations to separate the belligerents forcefully.

A tactical commander executing combat operations in the third “block” faces one of the most difficult operating environments for military forces, urban terrain. Not only must the tactical employment of fire support, logistics, and maneuver be considered for decisive operations, but the high number of non-combatants within the city or town must

also be taken into account. History demonstrates that non-combatants are most susceptible to become casualties during combat operations in built-up areas. In the battle of Manila in 1945, 100,000 (estimated) non-combatants and 1010 U.S. servicemen were killed. In Hue in 1968 over 5,800 non-combatants were killed along with 150 U.S. and over 400 Republic of South Vietnam soldiers. In Panama in 1989, 202 non-combatants and 26 U.S. servicemen were killed.²⁶ These statistics demonstrate that a tactical commander operating in the third block conducting low to mid-intensity operations must plan on the presence of a large number of non-combatants and can expect casualties unless steps are taken to ensure non-combatants are evacuated. A dichotomy of missions will exist when combat operations are conducted as part of a "Three Block War" that also includes HA and PKO missions, which attempt to avoid conflict. Tactical unit commanders will find it extremely difficult to focus while operating in this complex scenario.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, developing nations have experienced greater internal strife due to failing economics, dormant rivalries, and urban areas strained by exploding populations. Governments of those nations unable to properly handle all of these problems experience crises as destabilization of their nations begins. When this destabilization spreads beyond the borders of that particular nation and regional stability is threatened, the UN steps in to conduct stability operations, which range from HA to Peace Enforcement Operations.

As urban areas rise in importance due to economics and culture, they also are the greatest focus for conflict. U.S. military forces conducting stability operations will find themselves in the middle of a complex operating environment referred to as the "Three

Block War.” The CJTF acting as the operational commander must understand the tasks tactical commanders will be required to perform in order to set the proper conditions for their success. To shape the operating environment so that tactical actions are linked to the strategic endstate the CJTF must effectively plan these three major operations (HA, Peace Operations, Combat Operations) so that they are linked to the strategic endstate.

Chapter III – The JTF Commander

Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious.
Those who discern when to use many or few troops are victorious.
Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious.²⁷

Sun Tzu

Functions and Tasks of the CJTF

Tactical tasks successfully performed do not automatically bring strategic success in war or MOOTW. As mentioned previously, the U.S. military will normally conduct significant military operations as a joint force in order to accomplish the political objectives of the National Command Authority of the United States. In the “Three Block War”, tactical commanders will be assigned or attached under operational control (OPCON) to a JTF in order to conduct military operations. The CJTF’s responsibilities are outlined and explained thoroughly in joint doctrine and are defined below.

CJTFs are responsible for unified actions that are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from an alliance, coalition or superior commander (CINC). CJTFs ensure their joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations (Joint Pub 3-0).²⁸

CJTFs have specific tasks to perform that will greatly influence the outcome of a “Three Block War.” These tasks include organizing an operational area, establishing appropriate command relationships and developing a campaign plan.

First, CJTF’s must organize the operational area into Areas of Operations (AO), Amphibious Objective Areas (AOA), Joint Special Operations Areas (JSOA), Joint Rear Area (JRA), and Areas of Interest (AI) as required. This organization assists in coordination and deconfliction of joint action. The size of each area depends on the scope

and nature of the crisis and projected duration of the operation. Except in time of war, the Joint Operations Area (JOA) is normally established by the geographic CINC and assigned to a CJTF in order to conduct military operations to accomplish a specific mission. This will normally include an area of operations (AO) in which the "Three Block War" is conducted.²⁹

Second, the CJTF must establish command relationships within the JTF itself in order to provide unity of effort, unity of command, centralized planning with decentralized execution and provide common doctrine. The CJTF may organize along service component commanders, such as Air Force forces only, Navy forces only, Marine Corps forces only and Army forces only. The CJTF may also organize along functional commands that include the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), and the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) in order to perform operational missions across the range of military missions. The CJTF may also establish subordinate JTFs to conduct specific operations, such as a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF).³⁰

The last function the CJTF must perform is to develop an operational plan utilizing operational art. This plan is developed by the CJTF's staff and is expressed in the form of a campaign plan. Campaign plans are operational plans which perform the vital tasks of synchronizing tactical operations by 1) establishing command relationships among subordinate commands, 2) describing the concept of operations, 3) assigning tasks and objectives and 4) task- organizing assigned forces. Campaign plans coordinate and synchronize the efforts of air, land, sea, and special operations forces as well as

interagency and multinational operations. The campaign plan links tactical battles and engagements to the overall strategic endstate. It gives guidance to subordinate commanders on the CJTF's intent concerning when to engage and when to avoid engagements that do not support the endstate.³¹

Campaign plans are developed utilizing operational art. Operational art is defined as the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of major operations and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed. In the "Three Block War" the major operations constitute each "Block." The CJTF must utilize operational art when developing his campaign in order to synchronize each of the major operations of HA missions, peace operations and low to mid-intensity combat all within an assigned Joint Operations Area that includes an urban environment.³²

Influence of the CJTF on the Operating Environment

The CJTF must take certain actions to shape and determine future operations. CJTFs must create the most advantageous conditions for tactical actions by shaping the situation so that the outcome is merely a matter of course. Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese military theorist stated, "a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."³³ Joint Publication 3-0, Operations, states there are seven key considerations CJTF should take before initiating operations. They are preparing the theater, isolating the enemy, movement to attain operational reach, special operations, protection of forces and their freedom of action, control of space and constant assessment of the physical environment.³⁴ Each of these will help the CJTF develop his campaign

plan to influence the environment and set the proper conditions for tactical commanders in the "Three Block War."

In preparing a theater the CJTF must gain intelligence and prepare units through training and proper organization. First, CJTFs must develop intelligence estimates to determine potential and real threats within the operating environment. These include threat capabilities, potential courses of action and any indications and warnings that will assist them in anticipating their next course of action. This intelligence is acquired through the use of national assets such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or by the CJTFs available direct reconnaissance and surveillance assets. In a "Three Block War" national overhead assets may not be the best collectors of intelligence. Instead, human intelligence (HUMINT) from the actual crisis area will be of most benefit. CJTFs can gain great situational awareness of the terrain and environment through detailed studies of the culture, city or town designs to include infrastructure, operating ports and airfields. These studies will yield valuable conclusions regarding the best locations for reception of tactical commands and host nation support he can count on to minimize his logistical footprint.

The CJTF is responsible for organizing and training forces before they enter the JOA. This is vital in scenarios that encompass a "Three Block War." As mentioned previously, combat forces are not specifically trained to conduct HA missions or Peace Operations. Add urban terrain and it will be necessary to conduct specific training to operate within these complex environments. Although many JTFs are formed for specific missions, Joint Pub 3-0 recommends that CONUS- based forces participate in regularly scheduled exercises that simulate the most likely scenarios.³⁵ CJTFs must also attempt to

gain an understanding of coalition or allied forces that will be operating with the JTF. Critical information of importance to CJTF includes details on coalition nation communication capability, operating doctrine, tactical mobility and logistical support requirements and capabilities.

To isolate the threat, CJTFs should deny potential adversaries sanctuaries and allies. The CJTF can perform this function using a myriad of means to influence the operating area of the "Three Block War." First is the use of psychological operations. The CJTF can employ psychological operations (psyop) to strip away the local population support for JTF adversaries. As indicated before, non-combatant considerations in urban areas pose great difficulty for tactical commanders in any of the three different "Blocks." Overall, the CJTF wants to deny potential adversaries both physical support (arms, supplies, etc.) and psychological support (will of the local populace, international favor, etc.). The CJTF can accomplish this two ways: coercion or denial. Coercion takes the form of regularly scheduled conferences with disgruntled factions within an operating area. Denial activities utilize tactical actions against one or all factions in order to remove a threat, such as weapons caches, propaganda radio stations or key terrain.

The "Three Block War" contains divergent scenarios with regard to the use of force. Too much force can increase tensions and turn the populace against you; too little force to act as a deterrent can increase hostilities by one side perceiving weakness and attempting to impose their will upon the JTF. CJTFs can position forces to obtain operational reach in order to meet the divergent requirements of the "Three Block War." This can be obtained by utilizing intra-theater lift or if possible placing critical forces for force protection offshore in international waters. The overall purpose is to position forces

so that they are able to rapidly strike adversaries who threaten mission success or so they can meet critical needs of the JTF. "Three Block War" forces will need to be flexible in order to meet the wide ranging needs demanded of the JTF.

Special Operating Forces (SOF) are highly trained and skilled service members under the command of the JSOTF and capable of conducting specific missions that can assist the CJTF in obtaining operational leverage. SOF come with the requisite language and cultural skills to interact with the local populace. This interaction can garnish intelligence and build rapport in support of conventional forces. SOF also possess the necessary direct action skills that are very useful when operating in an urban environment. Their close quarter battle skills allow the CJTF to conduct precision attacks against threats while minimizing collateral damage within the urban environment. Direct action can remove a threat at a minimal cost to non-combatants.

Forces operating under austere conditions must be protected from unusual threats such as infectious disease or terrorists attacks. The high visibility afforded U.S. military forces by international media makes them subjects of possible attack. The CJTF must be in tune with the operating environment and the types of threats that it contains and ensure his tactical commanders are resourced properly to permit their freedom of action. This includes the appropriate equipment for the operating environment, inoculations against infectious diseases and a streamlined intelligence community that can deliver vital indications and warnings of possible threats rapidly.

Space-based assets have become critical for JTFs; gathering intelligence and providing communications for controlling forces. Signal intelligence has proved invaluable by providing indications and warning that alerts commanders to possible threats against the

JTF. It is crucial for the CJTF to be able to pass this information rapidly to his tactical commanders in order for them to take appropriate action. Communications offered by space-based systems allows the CJTF to reach back to national intelligence agencies and gather pertinent information with which to process his campaign. It also allows him to communicate with tactical commanders who are spread out over distances beyond normal military tactical communication ranges or who are located within an urban environment which significantly degrades most radio signals. One means to ensure these systems are utilized is to request a liaison officer from Space Command to ensure its capabilities and limitations are exploited.

The CJTF must understand and appreciate the physical environment the JTF will be operating within. Seasonal effects on the terrain, airspace, and littorals can hamper urban operations and should be assessed before MOOT are conducted. In the “Three Block War,” CJTFs must not only be concerned with the urban environment offered by cities and towns, but also with the approaches to urban areas that eventually become the lines of communications for the operation.

Conclusion

CJTFs must address the joint considerations before combat identified above in order to set the proper conditions for the success of tactical actions thereby achieving the strategic endstate of a campaign. Utilizing the “Boyd Cycle”, or Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop, CJTFs must constantly review their operating environment, as each action undertaken will create a reaction. The CJTF must be thinking ahead in time in order to be properly prepared. In this manner he will always be acting – not reacting to new threats or rapidly changing situations. An analysis of the operations in Somalia during the

early 1990's will help to better understand how a CJTF operates in a "Three Block War" and applies the joint doctrine identified above.

Chapter IV – Somalia: A “Three Block War”

Somalia Operational Synopsis

The dictator Siyad Barrah (a.k.a. –Siad Barre) had ruled Somalia with his extended family since 1969. Somalia was initially a client state of Russia during the Cold War but Siyad Barrah's failed excursion into another Russian client state, Ethiopia, required him to switch allegiance. Barrah turned to the United States for arms and economic aid. The Carter and Reagan Administrations obliged with modern weapons and millions of dollars in aid to secure the strategic Horn of Africa. In 1991, several clans whose only common belief was to rid the country of the despised dictator toppled the Barrah government. After Barrah's flight to Nigeria, no single clan was able to successfully gain power; anarchy took hold of the country. Normal routines of agriculture and business were disrupted and soon clans were hoarding food and medicine denying these to their opponents and distributing them to their supporters. By the summer of 1992, over 300,000 Somali's were reportedly dead of starvation. Moreover, a drought had struck east Africa, promising to create a mass death toll not seen in decades.³⁶

Operations in Somalia covered three distinct missions based on different UN different mandates and had different goals and resources applied to them for mission success. The first mission was United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM), which included the U.S. humanitarian flights of relief supplies under Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. The second mission was United Task Force (UNITAF) which was the 38,000 man military involvement to secure the food distribution and the third mission was UNOSOM II, which was an attempt to build-off of UNITAF's success and conduct nation-building. On 27 April 1992, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 751 which began

the first operation entitled United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).³⁷ The U.S. did not immediately support this operation with military servicemen or equipment and the 51 Pakistani soldiers deployed could only watch the incredible looting and starvation occurring in Mogadishu as global relief agencies attempted to relieve the suffering. In late 1992, an election year, President George Bush decided to take action in order to assist UN relief efforts. The euphoria over the success of Operation DESERT STORM and the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to generate the notion that the U.S. could accomplish anything with its military might. The National Command Authority ordered Marine Corps General Joseph P. Hoar, Commander-in-Chief, Central Command (USCINCCENT), to conduct an airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa, Kenya into Mogadishu, Somalia. This operation was called Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. A JTF was established under Brigadier General Frank Libutti, USMC, with approximately 500 personnel, three C-141s, and eight to fourteen C-130Es from the 314th Airlift Wing USAF to conduct the airlift of supplies. Although JTF Provide Comfort provided fifty million meals and almost 15, 000 tons of humanitarian cargo, it did not provide protection for the relief supplies which were quickly stolen by either the Ali Mahdi or Aideed clans.³⁸

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was not a "Three Block War." Yet, it does provide an example of how the CJTF operates in a MOOTW environment. First, BG Libutti, the operational commander of JTF Provide Comfort, deployed under the auspices of a UN mandate. BG Libutti knew that his mission required him to work with civilian relief agencies that did not want a huge armed military presence. This placed him in a difficult position. He knew he must cooperate with relief agencies because they were the ones who were going to distribute the aid his JTF delivered. His quandary was to protect

his forces as they flew into Mogadishu and other Somali towns such as Kismayo. To overcome this, BG Libutti stationed his JTF in Mombassa, Kenya which provided him operational reach without having to place support personnel on the ground in Somalia. Mombassa was close enough to fly in and out without refueling. BG Libutti also placed a flying Quick Reaction Force (QRF) aboard an aircraft that circled overhead while other aircraft delivered supplies. Although the International Red Cross stated they wanted no armed personnel on the ground, BG Libutti did place some of his Special Forces on the ground to gain intelligence on the situation. Overall, BG Libutti prepared his Joint Operations Area by gaining intelligence through the skillful use of his SOF, provided force protection through the airborne QRF, and protected his assets in Mombassa, Kenya with a Military Police (MP) platoon from the Berlin Brigade. The accomplishment of his mission depended on setting the initial conditions in which his JTF had to operate by coordinating with the relief agencies to allow his tactical commanders, the pilots and their aircrews and the QRF, to conduct their missions free of interference. The one limitation at the CJTF level was the nature of the JTF organization itself. Central Command (CENTCOM) had deployed a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) to Somalia to determine the requirements of the future mission. This team when it returned became the nucleus of JTF Provide Comfort.³⁹ Principally an airlift operation involving United States Air Force (USAF) assets and operations, the JTF should more appropriately have been formed around an experienced, existing USAF staff with appropriate augmentation from the other services or commands (i.e. U.S. Special Operations Command (USOCOM) for security).

Operation RESTORE HOPE

The reasons the U.S. introduced substantial military forces into Somalia were primarily political in nature. Some believed this policy, a reversal of the initial recommendation made by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was due to the personal loyalty of the military for President Bush's capable leadership throughout prior crises (Panama, the Gulf War). His administration had employed military forces successfully with minimum casualties and had earned it a reputation as a force that could accomplish the mission assigned. Others thought a certain type of victory disease had infected the U.S. military and it thought it could not lose after its successes in Panama, the Persian Gulf and Northern Iraq. Finally, others argued that it was due to an administration wanting to wield its power one more time after losing the November 1992 presidential election. For whatever reason, on 4 May 1992, President Bush announced a massive multinational force led by the U.S. to enforce UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 794 passed on the previous day. This resolution specified two important missions. First, UNSCR 794 provided humanitarian assistance to the Somalia people. Second, it mandated the restoration of order in southern Somalia.⁴⁰ USCINCENT, the geographic CINC under which operations in Somalia were to be conducted, published the following mission statement:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO's in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces.⁴¹

The term, secure, is defined as gaining possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action.⁴²

General Hoar, USCINCCENT, had been planning for intervention into Somalia since early 1992 and had selected the experienced First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) based out of Camp Pendleton, California to be the nucleus of a JTF headquarters. Commanded by Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC, I MEF had participated in Operation DESERT STORM as a major command with over 70,000 Marines formed into two Marine Divisions, a Marine Air Wing and a Force Service Support Group. This experience paid off when the UNITAF force eventually expanded to 38,000 troops contributed from over 20 coalition nations.⁴³

LtGen Johnston's operational plan for Somalia contained four phases. Phase I consisted of establishing a base of operations in Mogadishu, gaining control of relief supplies into and through the city, introducing other forces into the city, and securing the town of Baidoa. The time allotted by the CJTF for this phase was three weeks; it actually took one week. Phase II called for expanding operations to additional ports and airfields to include Baledogle just north of Mogadishu; expanding security in the country's interior via relief convoy escort and creation of additional relief distribution sites; and establishing security bases of operation at least in the towns of Gialalassi, Bardera, Belet Weyn, and Oddur. Phase II was allotted thirty days, but actually took twelve. Phase III called for further expansion of regional security and control of additional ports and airfields, especially Kismayo, in the south, which was hotly contested between forces loyal to Aideed and those loyal to Morgan, with the majority of its population caught in between. The plan

specified no timetable for this phase, which was accomplished within roughly two months. Phase IV called for the handoff to the UN, and was considered complete "when US forces had been relieved of their responsibilities in Somalia." The initial plan called for 240 days for UNITAF to conduct its mission and hand it over to the UN. It took approximately 146 days. However, U.S. forces remained in Somalia in one capacity or another for over 470 days until their final withdrawal in March 1994.⁴⁴

LtGen Johnston's operational plan intended to conduct the three distinctive operations of humanitarian assistance, peace operations and combat, if necessary, near simultaneously in each of the first three phases with the difference between each phase being an emphasis on the scale of each of these operations. Phases II and III were an expansion of the operations conducted in Phase I, while Phase IV was a hand-over of all operations to a UN force and UNITAF's complete withdrawal. To ensure tactical commanders could conduct these three distinctive missions near simultaneously, LtGen Johnston, as the CJTF and operational commander, was required to create the proper conditions within each phase.

Conditions Set by the CJTF

As stated in Chapter Two of this paper, the CJTF, according to Joint Publication 3-0 *Operations*, should consider how he prepares the theater for operations in order to set the proper conditions for tactical commanders. These included gaining intelligence, organizing and training the force, isolating the enemy, conducting movement to obtain operational reach, force protection, understanding the physical environment and utilizing special forces to gain leverage.

In considering the physical environment and acquiring certain intelligence on the threat through national and JTF assets, LtGen Johnston focused on key intelligence estimates regarding the conflict and the physical environment in which it existed. This intelligence was utilized to develop key indicators to determine whether his tactical operations were leading to the designated strategic endstate. Some of the initial intelligence estimates he focused on were:

- Approximately 4.5 million to 6 million people were effected by the clan warfare
- Estimated children's malnutrition rate was as high as 95%
- 300,000-500,000 had died
- Half of all Somali children born in 5 years had died
- 40-50 gunshot wounds treated per day in Mogadishu alone
- Economy and all other social institutions were shut down
- Looting Banditry and thievery necessary to ward off death and starvation
- Street price of an AK-47 Assault Weapon before UNITAF: (US) \$50
- Street price of a 50LB sack of wheat: (US) \$100
- Bardera death rate per day due to starvation: 300-325 persons⁴⁵

These estimates allowed him to assign specified tactical tasks to his subordinate commanders that, when linked together, would achieve the strategic endstate and lay the groundwork for the follow-on force. More importantly, these estimates assisted him in creating stabilization indicators (see Table 4-1), which would tell him when he was prepared to move to Phase IV of the operation.

Indicator	November 1992	April 1993
Bardera death rate due to starvation	300-325	0-5
Gunshot wounds per day in Mogadishu	45-50	0-5
Street price of an AK-47	(US) \$50	(US) \$1000
Street Price of a 50lb sack of wheat	(US)\$100	(US) \$7-10
Kurtan Population (NW of Baidoa)	10 Families	800 Families ⁴⁶

Table 4-1 Stabilization Indicators for UNITAF Commander

In preparing the theater with intelligence, the task was easy and difficult at the same time. It was easy in that the I MEF Deputy, BG Libutti, was already conducting Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. It was difficult in that Somalia offered a true intelligence nightmare for western intelligence agencies. There were no conventional forces against which to compute force ratios. The clan system was foreign to westerners and did not rely on high technology. In fact, its low level of technology sometimes befuddled the intelligence system that was designed to penetrate the high-tech Soviet Union.

Organizing and training forces proved difficult due to the limited time for the Marines of I MEF to prepare and deploy. Although Marines are expected to be in a high state of readiness associated with conventional combat operations, they were not completely ready to face the complex scenario found within Somalia. The other ground contingent, the 10th Mountain Division based in Fort Drum, New York, had just returned from a domestic support operation in Florida after the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew. This was fortunate in that they were experienced in HA missions. And yet, large differences remained. Besides the extreme climate difference between Fort Drum and Somalia, the operating environment in Somalia was much more complex. Tactical success in establishing a lodgment would depend on the JTF Commander's capability to rapidly deploy these forces to gain operational surprise.

To gain this operational surprise, the CJTF utilized operational and strategic movement of forces to attain operational reach. These deployments introduced combat forces rapidly enough with overwhelming combat power that had an immediate deterrent effect on the clans. For example, LtGen Johnston initially deployed the 15th MEU (SOC), a forward based Marine amphibious unit, to secure the port and airfield of Mogadishu in

order to introduce heavier forces into Somalia. This tactical mission was within their capabilities and achieved operational surprise by securing the port and airfield without incident using their capability to assault rapidly before clan forces could be organized against them. Another example involved deploying the 7th Marines, a Regimental Combat Team, from the Marine Corps desert training base, 29 Palms, California. These Marines are trained in desert operations and rapid deployment utilizing the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS). This allowed the CJTF to quickly introduce heavy forces without complete reliance on strategic airlift for personnel and equipment. The 7th Marines initially was limited in its readiness to conduct operations in Somalia in that their training was focused on open desert style warfare involving maneuver and firepower through combined arms operations. Patrolling the crowded streets of Mogadishu with its numerous non-combatants required tremendous adjustments for the 7th Marines. The CJTF also created Task Force 36, headed by the 36th Engineer Brigade. This Task Force consolidated all engineering assets and give focus to the massive engineering requirement in restoring certain basic services within Somalia.

Another CJTF demonstration where conditions were set involve his ability to isolate the enemy or threat; in this case, by developing a strong working relationship with the senior diplomat and President Bush's Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Oakley. Between the two, they were able to develop the criteria for the clans to follow in order to avoid conflict within Somalia. This helped ensure UNITAF maintained impartiality from initial deployment and throughout UNITAF's operation. This relationship developed into a committee entitled the Combined Security Committee, which not only included the Ambassador and the CJTF but the warring clan leaders. Through this dialogue, the CJTF

was able to explain his operations, the requirements each clan had to follow, and discuss any misperceptions the clans might have with UNITAF or vice versa. This committee with its open dialogue prevented interference from the clans with the CJTF's tactical operations.⁴⁷

Force protection in Somalia proved to be one of the more difficult tasks due to the harsh environmental conditions and complex operating environment. The exotic diseases normally associated with that portion of the world were enhanced by the breakdown in sanitation services within the country itself. Military forces were required to receive numerous inoculations against a number of fatal diseases present. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) published by the CJTF also gave forces the ability to use force to defend against attack or threat of an attack. Regarding numerous non-combatants, the ROE also allowed forces to detain civilians for security reasons or self-defense.⁴⁸

Other Considerations for Setting Conditions

Although the topics mentioned above are doctrinal, the following areas the CJTF developed and instituted for UNITAF amplify how a CJTF can set the conditions for tactical commanders. The CJTF established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), Joint Information Bureau, Joint Visitors Bureau and a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, which removed distractions from tactical commanders and integrated the efforts of all agencies military, NGOs and PVOs towards the strategic endstate. The CMOC coordinated 60 relief agencies, which could coordinate and respond to relief agency requirements.⁴⁹ This ability enhanced LtGen Johnston's HA operation by utilizing the relief agencies for distribution while using his forces for hauling and security of relief supplies. The CMOC also identified long-term requirements which allowed the JTF to plan

ahead and properly task tactical units to carry out these missions. The Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was able to consolidate the media in order to provide the appropriate access to the mission and stories within the Somali Theater. The JIB hosted 750 news media representatives (95 US media organizations, 150 foreign news organizations).⁵⁰ This management assisted the CJTF in two ways. First, it allowed him to protect his tactical commanders from an overwhelming number of media personnel, who could hamper operations with their physical presence. Second, it allowed the media access to facts so that their stories would better represent the truth versus hearsay. The JIB also published a weekly newspaper to all the JTF, which allowed the CJTF to communicate with the dispersed forces and keep them informed on current events internal and external to the theater. The Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) controlled the flow of distinguished guests, ensuring tactical commanders would not become overwhelmed with possible taskings to escort or provide security for them. Once again, this allowed tactical commanders to focus on their assigned mission. Lastly, the JPOTF conducted information operations. Their leaflet drops before and after each operation removed the uncertainty amongst the clans of UNITAF's intentions or, at least, informed them that they would be overwhelmed and defeated if they attempted to resist. Another factor in how the CJTF set the proper conditions was dividing the Joint Operations Area into nine different Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS). This allowed the JTF to quickly expand to regions which needed food most while maintaining adequate command and control over such a vast area.

Conclusion

The following conclusions indicate that Somalia was for LtGen Johnston a "Three Block War." It contained the three different "blocks" of HA, peace enforcement and

combat. The mission for UNITAF was mandated by the UN as a Chapter VII operation to conduct Peace Enforcement and relieve endemic humanitarian suffering. It was planned and led by the U.S. as a coalition of over 20 nations totaling over 38,000 troops. Since it was a Peace Enforcement Operation, the CJTF utilized his troops primarily in their combat role by tasking them with creating an overall secure environment for the NGOs and PVOs to distribute food. This allowed for the rapid deployment of forces from the continental United States with little humanitarian assistance training, although this could have backfired if the situation in Mogadishu had become violent and MOUT training had been required. As required in a HA mission, the CJTF established stabilization indicators, which could be physically measured in order to know when his mission had been accomplished. He also created a CMOC, which allowed for the close coordination between military units, NGOs and PVOs. His creation of the JIB and JVB allowed for the appropriate control of information and handling of distinguished guests without overburdening his tactical commanders.

Chapter V – Conclusions

The arguments developed in this monograph anticipate that a tremendously complex environment will confront a future CJTF when conducting a “Three Block War.” No longer facing a linear battlefield with easy to define opponents and objectives, the CJTF will face both challenges and opportunities while conducting distributed operations in an unforgiving environment. The challenges will include conducting operations in an urban area ripe for conflict with numerous non-combatants present, belonging to a low-tech society where human intelligence will be the best means of determining an adversary’s intention. The CJTF will be further challenged by operating in view of the world as today’s mass media covers every action and can deliver the wrong message or perception to an uninformed audience. Opportunities will be presented in the form of greater diplomatic/ military cooperation to solve problems, and integrating civilian agencies such as NGOs and PVOs to obtain mission accomplishment. Information operations will neutralize threats with greater effect than conventional weapons.

The Challenges

The increase in world population and its natural movement toward urban areas is contributing to instability in lesser-developed nations throughout the world. Further, this migration increases the number of non-combatants located within the urban areas of these nations making it difficult for tactical commanders to identify, isolate and counter those elements which threaten mission success. Urban areas are also expanding, because of direct foreign investment by MNCs to develop emerging markets. Because cities possess improved infrastructure and house local governments, they take on an important cultural and monetary significance. This significance will not be lost on opposing factions, which

seek change through insurrection or open force of arms. Their struggle will attempt to utilize the population as a means to achieve their goals. In Somalia, clans often denied food to one segment of the population in order to gain political influence or even dominance over another clan.

The purpose of a U.S. led JTF, deployed to a crisis area such as Somalia could be to break the chain of violence, relieve human suffering, and provide a secure environment for the employment of diplomatic and economic solutions. The CJTF may face a requirement to conduct Humanitarian Assistance, Peace Enforcement, and combat operations simultaneously in order to establish and maintain a stable environment.

The CJTF must set certain conditions to ensure tactical commanders can successfully complete their missions. In order to do this, the CJTF must recognize that the JTF is entering a "Three Block War" scenario. Why? Because he must design his campaign to meet the requirements of these divergent "blocks" and assign tactical tasks to subordinate commands as well as provide those commands with the proper tools to accomplish their missions.

Diplomatic/ Military Cooperation

Diplomatic/ Military cooperation will assist the CJTF by establishing a favorable political environment in which his force can operate. Cooperation between Lieutenant General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley during UNITAF highlighted how diplomacy can enable a mission and set the conditions for JTF employment. Through Ambassador Oakley's negotiations, LtGen Johnston did not have to fight his way into Mogadishu. LtGen Johnston also supported diplomacy by rapidly landing a credible force to backup the Ambassador's claims of action. The CJTF must also work closely with the President's or

UN's ambassador in order to determine what the purpose of the mission is and what military endstate they expect so the CJTF can determine military measures of success to know when he has achieved that endstate. Once again, UNITAF highlighted this by LtGen Johnston being able to set measures of success that effectively told him when he had achieved mission success.

Diplomatic/Military cooperation will also be visible in the establishment of the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Although the issuing and constant updating of the ROE is up to the military, it must be consistent with the political objectives. If the ROE is too restrictive, it will not allow the military to be a credible deterrent. If the ROE is too aggressive, it will bring into question the purpose of the military force. This tension is especially evident in "Three Block Wars," where combat operations and HA missions are occurring simultaneously. UNITAF's ROE was aggressive with its respect to its right to self-defense, but restrictive with regards to the manner in which forces handled non-combatant personal property.

Integration of Civilian Agencies

Although experience gleaned from operations in the 1990's has increased the cooperation and understanding between the military and civilian relief agencies, there still needs to be detailed coordination between a JTF and outside agencies. The establishment of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) allows close coordination between the JTF and NGOs and PVOs. This coordination is especially important in a "Three Block War" because one of the JTF's missions will be to provide support to HA. It is best to let NGOs and PVOs distribute aid, which is more in their area of expertise, and allow military forces to provide a secure setting, which is more in its area of expertise. During UNITAF, the

JTF utilized the CMOC to coordinate with U.S. government agencies and independent relief agencies to distribute relief supplies and medical aid throughout southern Somalia. The key to CMOC operations is coordination.

Information Operations

In the "Three Block War" one of the keys to operational success will be the gathering, dissemination and countering of information. Information is a powerful tool, especially in an area that has been deprived of objective reporting for an extended period of time. The CJTF can initiate and sustain information operations by establishing a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) under the JTF. The JPOTF's mission is to coordinate the overall information operation of the JTF and ensure an effective message is being disseminated. The JPOTF's tools include radio and loudspeaker broadcast, printing of newspapers, flyers, and leaflets and overseeing their effective distribution. The JPOTF can target its information operations against a threat or potential ally so that they understand the intent of JTF operations. This was accomplished with UNITAF when they published the four No's in regard to hostile intent and weapons being displayed. Also in UNITAF, the JPOTF directed leaflet drops before and after certain combat operations to explain the purpose of the operation and the consequences if action was taken against JTF forces.

The JTF

JTF's of the future will be even more tailored to the mission so as to utilize the limited assets of the U.S. military effectively. In the "Three Block War," a CJTF will need highly skilled forces to fight, negotiate and handle immense security requirements as well as restore critical infrastructure. The JTF will need to deploy rapidly into the theater and

begin producing results immediately. The makeup of these forces will not resemble the Cold War forces of divisions and corps, but smaller Task Forces organized to meet specific requirements. One such organization was Task Force 36 (TF 36) under UNITAF. TF 36 consolidated all engineer assets, no matter what service or nation, under the 36th Engineer Group. It assigned different tasks to its subordinates to rebuild critical infrastructure, such as airfield and road improvement enabling JTF mission accomplishment.

Also in the future, when a JTF is deployed to a crisis area it will not operate alone. Although the United States, as the world's remaining super power, will be required to act in order to prevent the spread of instability, it will not act alone. Due to the rapid power projection capability of the U.S., it will lead either an alliance such as NATO or a coalition of nations as represented in Somalia, Haiti and Northern Iraq. As soon as the situation has stabilized, the U.S. will seek to hand the mission off to either the national government or to a U.N. led force which may or may not be composed of U.S. forces. This also creates challenges and opportunities for the CJTF. One challenge can best be summed up in an issue that both the CJTF and UNITAF had to face. Nigeria deployed a contingent to aid Operation RESTORE HOPE. Unfortunately it was Nigeria that gave asylum to the former dictator of Somalia, Siad Barrah. This created political tension and mistrust between the Somali people and the Nigerian contingent. Another challenge is the number of coalition contingents. UNITAF contained over 20 coalition partners, who brought 20 different chains of command, 20 different operating doctrines, and 20 different logistical systems that had to be coordinated into a cohesive JTF. To conduct this coordination, the JTF employed liaison teams. The JTF staff for UNITAF, at its peak, grew to over 700 officers and men; about 450 more than the normal operating headquarters of I MEF. In addition,

coalition partners can contribute in increased manpower and assets to accomplish the mission.

Overall, the CJTF must evaluate the JTF and determine its strengths and weaknesses. In UNITAF, the combat experienced 7th Marines were a rapidly deployable cohesive unit that wielded significant combat power. Yet, its focus was on an open desert style of warfare. It was not trained for the MOUT scenario that would confront it in Mogadishu. The 10th Mountain possessed recent experience in supporting HA operations. It's Hurricane Andrew relief experience, however, took place in a benign environment within the United States.

The "Three Block War" and Joint Doctrine

Finally, throughout the research for this monograph, Joint Doctrine supported each of the "blocks" adequately. Joint Publication 3-07 *Military Operations Other Than War* (MOOTW), Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07.6 *Joint, Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations* all addressed the issues facing tactical commanders and the CJTF in a "Three Block War."

Conclusion

Overall this monograph has attempted to describe General Krulak's vision of future conflict described in the phrase, "Three Block War." Complex strategic scenarios involving HA, peace operations and combat operations within an urban environment will require operational commanders to design campaigns that link these major operations in time, space and purpose in order to achieve strategic goals. It is imperative that CJTF's enable tactical commanders to accomplish their mission by setting certain conditions.

These conditions include diplomatic and military cooperation, integration of civilian agencies, information operations and tailoring the JTF.

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